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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark Clayton Boman appeals from the judgment of conviction following his jury
trial.

He asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his alibi

witness from testifying due to his failure to comply with the notice requirement of Idaho
Code § 19-519 without balancing his right to a fair trial against any prejudice to the
State. He further asserts that the prosecutor engaged in unobjected-to misconduct in
closing arguments that constituted fundamental error in that it deprived him of his due
process right to a fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Boman was charged with conspiracy to commit trafficking in heroin for events
alleged to have occurred in January 2010.

Under the State's theory of the case,

Mr. Boman conspired with Vicki Ornelas and Jesse Duran to obtain heroin in one ounce
increments from a source in California through the U.S. Postal Service. (R., pp.20-22.)
The three co-defendants' cases were initially consolidated for trial (R., p.13); however,
Mr. Duran pleaded guilty the morning of trial (Trial.Tr., p.48, Ls.13-15), and Ms. Ornelas
testified as a cooperating witness for the State. (Trial.Tr., pp.428-85.)
At trial, the State presented evidence that a postal worker, William Gans, became
suspicious upon receiving an Express Mail 1 package addressed to Jesse Duran. The
facts that caused him to become suspicious were that he had recently delivered two
other Express Mail packages addressed to Jesse Duran, that Mr. Duran lived in a bad

1

Express Mail is the only guaranteed service offered by the U.S. Postal Service. The
postal service guarantees that it will deliver an Express Mail package in one day or the
customer will receive a refund. (Trial.Tr., p.319, Ls.9-22.)
1

neighborhood, which, given the high cost of sending items via Express Mail makes
receipt of several Express Mail packages unusual, that the deliveries were to a
residence rather than to a business, and that the packages obviously contained
something other than documents.

(Trial.Tr., p.319, L.9 - p.328, L.17.)

Mr. Gans

contacted the local postal inspector, Rod Herr, regarding his suspicions, and was told to
hold the package rather than deliver it. (Trial.Tr., p.330, Ls.1-17.)
Kevin Holtry of the Boise Police Department, a drug dog handler, assisted the
postal inspector by conducting a "package sniff' of the suspicious Express Mail
package. The drug dog alerted on the package, which, in his opinion meant that the
dog had detected one of the four controlled substances (cocaine, methamphetamine,
heroin, and marijuana) that he is trained to detect. (Trial.Tr., p.282, L.7 - p.285, L.13.)
As a result of the drug dog's alert on the package, Inspector Herr obtained a federal
search warrant to open the package, and approximately one ounce of suspected heroin
was found inside. After a field test indicated that it could be heroin, the package was
resealed and prepared for a controlled delivery. (Trial.Tr., p.308, L.14 - p.311, L.3.)
On January 20, 2010, when the package was not delivered as scheduled,
Mr. Gans received a phone call from a woman asking about it. The next day, he left a
message for someone who had inquired about the package in a message left with
another postal employee, 2 leaving a voice mail in which he explained that the package
had been located but would have to be picked up at the post office because they were
too understaffed to deliver it. (Trial.Tr., p.333, Ls.1-24.)

2

Telephone records were introduced showing that a call was made from Mr. Boman's
phone number to the post office from which the Express Mail package was later
retrieved. (Trial.Tr., p.412, Ls.5-12; p.494, Ls.6-12.)
2

A postal employee, Amy Farnham, testified that, on January 20, 2010, a man she
later identified as Mr. Boman inquired about the package, and that she was unable to
find it, which caused her to become suspicious. After Mr. Boman left the post office,
she went to the window and got the license plate number off of his truck. She saw
Mr. Boman pick-up the package the next day.

(Trial.Tr., p.359, L.17 - p.368, L.19.)

Another postal employee, John Stinchcomb, testified that a person he later identified as
Mr. Boman picked the package up at the post office on January 21, 2010. He noted
that Mr. Boman told him that he was picking up the package for a friend, Jesse Duran,
and showed him Mr. Duran's identification card.

When he signed for the package,

Mr. Boman signed as Jesse Duran. Mr. Stinchcomb testified that it was "not out of the
ordinary" for someone to sign the addressee's name when retrieving a package for
another person "because they think that's the name they are supposed to sign."
(Trial.Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.393, L.14.)
Ms. Ornelas then testified that she was Jesse Duran's girlfriend of three years,
and that they were both addicted to heroin, and that, together, they used approximately
seven grams o'f heroin per week. (Trial.Tr., p.428, L.18-p.431, L.17.) She stated that
Mr. Duran supplied her with heroin from the fresh supply that he received every one to
two weeks. (Trial.Tr., p.433, L.13 - p.436, L.14.) Ms. Ornelas explained that she had
heard conversations between Mr. Boman and Mr. Duran in which they discussed going
"halters" on a shipment o'f heroin. (Trial.Tr., p.442, L. 11 - p.443, L.5.) She testified that
each shipment of heroin that Mr. Duran ordered was a "piece" or a "Mexican ounce"
both of which are slang terms for twenty-four grams.

(Trial.Tr., p.443, L.6 - p.444,

L 19.) Ms. Ornelas testified that Mr. Duran ordered the heroin by phone from a source
in California, that she had seen him wire the money for the heroin three or four times,
3

and that she believed that packages of heroin had been mailed to their house about four
times. (Trial.Tr., p.446, L.17 - p.457, L.22.)
Mr. Ornelas also testified that she witnessed Mr. Duran and Mr. Boman dividing
up heroin from a package before cutting it with sugar. (Trial.Tr., p.458, L.13 - p.459,
L.2.) She further testified that Mr. Duran sold the heroin that they didn't use, making
about $900 in profit per week.

(Trial.Tr., p.466, Ls.15-22.)

She then said that

Mr. Boman had sold Mr. Duran two grams of heroin for $200 just before the package
was picked upon January 21, 2010, and that he went to pick up the package at the
request of Mr. Duran. (Trial.Tr., p.469, L.2 - p.473, L.11.)
Officer Nickerson of the Boise Police Department testified that he was assigned
to conduct a traffic stop of Mr. Boman's vehicle after the package was picked up. Upon
stopping Mr. Boman, Officer Nickerson immediately arrested him, and saw the package
retrieved from the vehicle by another officer. He questioned Mr. Boman, who told him
that he didn't know what was in the package, that his friend had asked him to pick it up,
and that if he had known that there was heroin in the package, he would have never
delivered it because he would have kept (and used) it for himself. (Trial.Tr., p.502, L.8 p.512, L.1.)
At the beginning of day two of the trial, the State moved to prevent Mr. Boman
from calling an alibi witness, Herbert Hoyt, because the existence and identity of that
witness was disclosed only three days before trial was set to begin. The alibi witness
would have testified that Mr. Boman was in Salt Lake City on January 20, at the time
that he was purportedly seen inquiring about the package at the post office.
(Trial.Tr., p.274, L.25 - p.280, L.15.) On day three of the trial, the district court ruled

4

that Mr. Hoyt's testimony was not admissible due to the defense's failure to comply with
the deadline requirements of J.C.§ 19-519. (Trial.Tr., p.587, Ls.5-7.)
After the State rested, defense counsel called Mr. Duran as a witness. During a
brief direct examination, Mr. Duran testified that he had pleaded guilty just before trial
was set to start because he was guilty, and that neither Ms. Ornelas nor Mr. Boman was
involved in his heroin trafficking. He further testified that Mr. Boman did not know what
was in the package when he asked him to pick it up for him. (Trial.Tr., p.520, L.12 p.521, L.22.) On cross-examination, the State questioned Mr. Duran in detail about his
plea colloquy. Mr. Duran's response was to assert his right to remain silent, and state,
"I am not going to answer any more of your questions." The jury was then excused from
the courtroom, and the State argued that Mr. Duran had no right to remain silent
because he had pleaded guilty. (Trial.Tr., p.525, L.22 - p.529, L.3.)
The following exchange then occurred between the Court, the State, and
Mr. Duran:
THE COURT:

That he has his right to remain silent and not answer
questions if your answers would incriminate you.
He has indicated at this point that he is not going to
answer any more questions.

[The State]:

I think I am free to ask him and he can invoke that
right in front of the jury.

THE COURT:

I think so. I think you are right.

[Mr. Duran]:

I am not going to answer any more.

THE COURT:

What it means is that he can ask you a question and
you can invoke your right to remain silent if that's
what you want to do.

(Trial.Tr., p.529, L.22 - p.530, L.10.) The jury was then brought back, before Mr. Duran
was then asked additional questions by the State, some of which he answered, and
5

some of which he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. (Trial.Tr., p.532,
L.17 - p.553, L.19, p.594, L.15 - p.598, L.16, p.613, L.8 - p.616, L.17.)
During closing arguments, the State argued, inter alia, "Have you heard any
evidence that Mark Boman was anywhere else ... He was there [at the post office] on
the 20th and he was there on the 21st." (Trial.Tr., p.661, L.22-p.662, L.17.) The State
also argued that Mr. Boman "forged Jesse's signature to get that package" on
January 21. (Trial.Tr., p.667, Ls.24-25.) Both of these arguments were made without
objection.
Mr. Boman was found guilty of trafficking in heroin. At the sentencing hearing,
the State requested that the district court impose a unified sentence of twenty-five
years, with fifteen years fixed. (Sent.Tr., p.7, L.8.) Defense counsel requested that the
district court imposed only the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years fixed.
(Sent.Tr., p.8, Ls.22-24.)

Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of

twenty-five years, with ten years fixed. (Sent.Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.16, L.3.) A Notice of
Appeal was filed timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.187.)

6

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded Mr. Boman's alibi
witness as a sanction for a discovery violation?

2.

Were Mr. Boman's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial violated by
the State's unobjected-to misconduct in closing arguments?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Excluded Mr. Boman's Alibi Witness As
A Sanction For A Discovery Violation

A

Introduction
Mr. Boman asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded

his alibi witness as a sanction for his failure to provide the requisite statutory notice of
that witness until three days before trial was scheduled to begin.

Specifically, the

district court abused its discretion when it failed to balance any prejudice asserted by
the State against Mr. Boman's right to a fair trial, and failed to consider lesser sanctions
before resorting to exclusion, the most severe sanction.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On appeal from an order imposing discovery sanctions, we review the trial

court's decision for an abuse of discretion."

State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287

(Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 846 (1999)). When reviewing a
trial court's discretionary decision, the appellate court considers (1) whether the district
court perceived that the issue was one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the
bounds of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal standards, and (3)
whether its decision was reached by an exercise of reason. Id.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Excluded Mr. Boman's Alibi
Witness As A Sanction For A Discovery Violation
On April 28, 2010, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-519, the State filed a written

demand that Mr. Boman provide notice if he intended to offer a defense of alibi.
(R., pp.55-56.) It is uncontested that defense counsel did not inform the State about its

8

intention of calling Mr. Hoyt as an alibi witness until August 6, 2010, three days before
the date set for the start of trial. (Trial.Tr., p.275, Ls.6-15.) On the second day of trial,
the State raised the issue of the late disclosure of the alibi witness, and asked that the
"witness not be allowed to testify because of late disclosure by the Defendant."
(Trial.Tr., p.275, Ls.6-19.)
In response, defense counsel explained that he was not informed as to the name
of the alibi witness until shortly before he disclosed it to the State.

(Trial.Tr., p.277,

Ls.8-12.) The district court explained, "I don't know that I would allow him to testify. I
think the State has to talk to him and then I will make the decision." (Trial.Tr., p.278,
Ls.22-24.) The following exchange then occurred:
[The State:]

Judge, in candor to the Court, I did send an
investigator out to meet with him [Mr. Hoyt] Friday.
did receive the information Friday morning. I sent an
investigator. It is my understanding that he is at the
Department of Correction south of town. An
investigator did go talk to him. However, because
Friday afternoon I got information about another
witness that may or may not have seen Mr. Boman
there, we can't corroborate. We can't do anything.

THE COURT:

That's the problem.

[The State:]

So out of fairness, I do want to let you know we did
speak to Mr. Hoyt. I can't corroborate or invalidate
anything he is going to say because of late disclosure.

THE COURT:

I know; that's the problem. That's the problem that
Mr. Boman has presented in this case by Mr. Boman
personally not disclosing the witness earlier.

(Trial.Tr., p.279, Ls.3-21.)
The following day, the alibi witness issue was again discussed.
argued,

g

The State

I had an opportunity last night to speak with him [Mr. Hoyt]. Not
cooperative with the State, I would say that. He was quite upset at having
been here all day long and missing out on CAP program and training.
So I had an investigator have a chance to speak with him Friday
afternoon. Obviously, I had a chance last night at 6:30 after we got out of
court to try and go talk with him. Again, the main issue the State has with
this, Judge, is he's providing information that could be corroborated or
may - could be invalidated, but the State doesn't have an opportunity to
do so.
For example, he says he was stopped by police down in Rupert. I am
sure there is some type of a dispatch call that an officer went out on
saying he was stopping a vehicle. I can't confirm that. He says that they
got gas at a gas station in Snowville, Utah. Again, there would be audio of
that, video of that, excuse me. I can't confirm that either. He says that
there was a witness that came and took the package and he knows that
witness's name, but he won't give me that witness's last name or his
address. There is just a lot of things I can't corroborate with that witness.
(Trial.Tr., p.583, L.23 - p.584, L.23.)
Ultimately, the district court ruled that the witness could not testify because
"pursuant to 19-519, it appears that it is untimely noticed[.]" (Trial.Tr., p.587, Ls.5-7.)
Idaho Code§ 19-519, in relevant part, provides:
(1) At any time after arraignment before a magistrate upon a complaint
and upon written demand of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant shall
serve, within ten (10) days or at such different time as the court may
direct, upon the prosecuting attorney, a written notice of his intention to
offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the
specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the
time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses
upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.

(4) Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements of this
section, the court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness
offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or presence at,
the scene of the alleged offense. This section shall not limit the right of
the defendant to testify in his own behalf.
Id.
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The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution implicitly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to present witnesses in
his defense.

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988).

This right can be violated

when, as a sanction for a discovery violation, the trial court excludes the testimony of a
defense witness.

Id., 484 U.S. at 409-10.

In extreme cases, mainly those cases

involving defense misconduct, it does not necessarily violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right for a trial court to exclude a defense witness who is not timely
disclosed. Id., 484 U.S. at 416.
In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court rejected Taylor's argument "that the
Sixth Amendment creates an absolute bar to the preclusion of the testimony of a
surprise witness[,]" calling it "just as unacceptable as the State's position that the
Amendment is simply irrelevant." Id., 484 U.S. at 410. In Taylor, defense counsel did
not disclose the later-excluded witness until the second day of the trial, despite his
having amended his witness list by adding two witness after the first day of trial and
having interviewed the undisclosed witness the week before trial began. In rejecting the
argument that exclusion was improper, the Court noted that defense counsel's behavior
was "willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is appropriate." The Court went
on to note that the attorney's misconduct gave "rise to a sufficiently strong inference that
'witnesses are being found that really weren't there"' which justified the sanction of
exclusion. Id., 484 U.S. at 416.
In State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court considered
the constitutional implications of a district court's order excluding a defense witness as a
sanction for a discovery violation. In that case, defense counsel sought to call a witness
at trial whose identity had not been disclosed to the State before trial. The district court
11

found that the failure to disclose was inadvertent, but concluded that the witness should
be excluded based on the discovery violation. The district court did leave its decision
open for reconsideration if the State had the time to interview the witness. Harris, 132
Idaho at 845.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing such a harsh sanction in light of the fact that
the trial court did not weigh any prejudice that might be suffered by the
State against Harris' right to a fair trial. The error was compounded by the
fact that the trial court placed the determination of whether the State could
interview and respond to the testimony within the discretion of the
prosecution .... The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
witness by not evaluating the prejudice to the State against Harris' right to
a fair trial and by allowing the prosecutor to make the determination of
whether the State would make a good faith effort to interview and respond
to the witness.

Id., 132 Idaho at 847 (emphasis added).
In this case, the State never estimated how long it would take to investigate the
information provided by Mr. Hoyt; it merely stated that it hadn't had the opportunity to do
so. The State never explained what, if any, actions it took to attempt to investigate the
alibi witness' information in the five days between when it received notice of the witness
and the second day of trial. Significantly, and unlike the facts in Harris and Taylor, both
of which involved mid-trial disclosure, the witness' existence (and all information
required under Idaho Code § 19-519) was disclosed to the State several days before

trial started. Despite this pre-trial disclosure, the State never requested a postponement
of trial or provision of any additional time during which to investigate and prepare to
rebut the anticipated testimony of the alibi witness. The State instead waited until the

12

second day of trial to raise the issue, 3 and requested the harshest possible sanction:
exclusion. If the State was so concerned about the prejudice of the late-disclosed alibi
witness, then why did it wait until the second day of trial before raising the issue? This
was sandbagging in its basest form.
Furthermore, the district court never considered less severe sanctions, including
a delay in the proceedings to allow the State to investigate the alibi witness' story, and
did nothing to inquire as to how long the State would need in order to be made whole for
the discovery violation.

See State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 211 (1995) (when

considering a sanction for discovery violations in a criminal case, "the trial court is called
upon to fashion a sanction which will impress counsel with the importance of responding
to discovery requests, and yet will not prejudice the defense of the case"). Additionally,
the district court never weighed any prejudice that the State would suffer against
Mr. Boman's right to a fair trial, as it was required to do. 4 See State v. Lamphere, 130
Idaho 630, 633-34 (1997).

In failing to apply the correct legal standard, specifically,

failing to weigh any potential prejudice to the State against Mr. Boman's right to a fair
trial, and in light of the State's failure to raise the issue before trial began, Mr. Boman
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his alibi witness as
a sanction for the discovery violation.
Mr. Boman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial at which

3

Appellate counsel is aware of the irony of raising the State's untimely motion in
arguing that Mr. Boman's late-disclosed witness should not have been excluded.
4
While it appears that the district court considered the State's bare assertion that it
would be prejudiced because it had not investigated the alibi witness' information prior
to the start of trial, the district court never inquired as to what actions the State had
taken to do so (or why it had failed to so investigate), nor did it consider the effect that
the exclusion would have on Mr. Boman's right to a fair trial.
13

Mr. Boman will have the opportunity to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to present
witnesses on his behalf.

11.
Mr. Boman's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State Committed
Unobjected-To Prosecutorial Misconduct In Its Closing Argument

A.

Introduction
Mr. Boman asserts that his due process rights were violated when the State

committed unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument. Specifically,
the State misrepresented the evidence presented in the case when it accused
Mr. Boman of committing an uncharged crime, forgery, and it argued that Mr. Boman
had produced no alibi evidence after it successfully prevented him from introducing
such evidence. The first instance constituted a misstatement of the evidence, while the
second allowed the State to shift the burden of proof to Mr. Boman and to take unfair
advantage of an evidentiary ruling in its favor.

8.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for unobjected to error as set forth by the Idaho Supreme

Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), is as follows:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.

Id. at 228.
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C.

Mr. Boman's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State Committed
Unobiected-To Prosecutorial Misconduct In Its Closing Argument
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court explained,
Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than
the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.

During its closing argument, the State twice violated Mr. Boman's due process
rights by engaging in prosecutorial misconduct The first instance occurred when the
State argued, "Have you heard any evidence that Mark Boman was anywhere else?"
after it had successfully excluded Mr. Boman's alibi witness who would have testified
that Mr. Boman was indeed somewhere else, specifically Salt Lake City, on January 20,
when he was, according to the State, at the post office in Boise.
The second instance involved the State accusing Mr. Boman of committing the
crime of forgery when the evidence that it presented was in direct conflict with the
accusation. Specifically, the State argued, "He forged Jesse [Duran]'s signature to get
that package."

(Trial.Tr., p.667, Ls.24-25.)

At trial, the State's sole witness to

Mr. Boman signing for the package, postal employee John Stinchcomb, testified on
direct examination that Mr. Boman had told him that he was picking up the package for
Mr. Duran, and that, in his experience, it was "not out of the ordinary" for someone to
sign the addressee's name when retrieving a package for another person "because they
think that's the name they are supposed to sign." (Trial.Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.393, L.14.)
Forgery, under Idaho law, requires the "intent to defraud another[.]" I.C. § 18-3601.
The State's argument, in which it accused Mr. Boman of forging Mr. Duran's
signature, when the evidence from its own witness contradicted its statement, plainly
15

violated Mr. Boman's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. See State v. Troutman,
148 Idaho 904, 911 (Ct. App. 2010) ("It is plainly improper for a party to present closing
argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence.").
With respect to whether the misconduct was harmless, Mr. Boman points to the
fact that the rules of evidence generally prohibit the mention of uncharged misconduct,
see Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), and that the main issue in dispute was what

Mr. Boman knew of the package's contents at the time that he picked it up. Common
sense dictates that wrongly accusing Mr. Boman of committing a separate crime related
to picking up the package would make it more likely that a jury would believe that
Mr. Boman was a person of bad character with a propensity to commit crimes.
The United States Constitution's guarantee of due process of law for a criminal
defendant includes a requirement that the State prove every element of a crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1979).

"Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor diminishing or distorting the state's burden to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Felder, 150 Idaho
269, 275 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993),
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010), and State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho

82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007)); see also Troutman, 148 Idaho at 910 ("A closing argument may
not misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden.") (citations omitted).
By arguing that Mr. Boman failed to present any evidence that he was
somewhere else at the time of the crime, the State diminished and distorted its burden
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

That type of burden-shifting plainly

violated Mr. Boman's constitutional right to due process of the law, and may have had
an impact on the jury's decision to convict Mr. Boman despite the lack of any direct
16

evidence that he knew what was in the Express Mail package. Standing alone, such
unobjected-to misconduct might be disposed of as a mere slip of the tongue not
amounting to misconduct, however, the State's argument is especially egregious in light
of the fact that it knew that Mr. Boman had a witness who would have provided him with
an alibi for January 20, 2010, when the State alleged he was participating in the
conspiracy by visiting the post office and inquiring about the package.
The State successfully prevented Mr.

Boman from exercising his Sixth

Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf, and then argued that he had failed to
present any evidence that he was somewhere else on January 20, 2010. Doing so was
inexcusable, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct; and a message should be sent that
such behavior will not be tolerated.

See State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451

(Ct. App. 1991) (Finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor "having
successfully urged the court for an order precluding the defense from eliciting contrary
evidence [regarding the victim's sexual history], the prosecutor was not permitted to
suggest in her argument that such evidence did not exist"); see also Commonwealth v.
Mosby, 413 N.E.2d 754, 760 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) ("[l]t is particularly improper for a
prosecutor to call the jury's attention to an absence of evidence when the absence is a
result of the prosecutor's objection to the introduction of that evidence").
Mr. Boman respectfully requests that this Court find that the prosecutor's
unobjected-to misconduct amounted to fundamental error, vacate the judgment of
conviction, and order that he receive a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Boman respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new
trial.
DATED this 6 th day of October, 2011.

(
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